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Mediated Moralities: Sociocultural
Approaches to Moral Development
Mark B. Tappan
Colby College
The purpose of this chapter is to present a sociocultural perspective on the study of moral
development, and to review theoretical and empirical work on moral development that
has been conducted under the rubric of this perspective. This perspective has emerged
over the course of the last decade or so, in response to a variety of challenges to prevail-
ing theories of moral development—in particular, challenges to Kohlberg’s (1963, 1969,
1976, 1981, 1984) stage theory of the development of justice reasoning. There is no doubt
that researchers and practitioners interested in understanding the vicissitudes of human
moral experience owe a singular debt to Kohlberg for bringing the study of moral devel-
opment into the mainstream of developmental and educational psychology, and his theory
is arguably still the best-known theory of moral development. Yet the past 25 years have
witnessed a growing awareness of the metatheoretical, theoretical, and methodological
limitations of Kohlberg’s cognitive–developmental attempt to formally reconstruct the
ontogenesis of competence in moral judgment making, via a sequence of six structurally
deﬁned, cross-culturally universal stages of justice reasoning.
Amongthemanyandvariedcritiquesof,andchallengesto,Kohlberg’sproject(see,for
example,Coles,1986;Cortese,1990;Flanagan,1991;Packer,1985,1992;Shweder,1982;
Sullivan, 1977; Turiel, 1983, 2002), the most signiﬁcant have come from those who have
argued that Kohlberg’s approach does not sufﬁciently acknowledge the multidimensional
and multivocal nature of the moral domain. In this regard Gilligan’s (1977, 1982) critique
thatclassicaltheoriesofmoraldevelopment—Freud’s(1923/1960),Piaget’s(1932/1965),
and,mostimportantly,Kohlberg’s—areﬂawedbecausetheysystematicallyexcludedgirls’
andwomen’sexperiencefromfoundationaltheory-buildingresearchstudiesismostwidely
known. Gilligan claimed that, for some people, an orientation other than the “justice
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voice” charted by Kohlberg, based on his all-male longitudinal research sample, provided
the primary focus for moral reasoning and moral action. Speciﬁcally, she identiﬁed what
she and her colleagues called a “care voice,” articulated most often by girls and women,
and most evident when researchers turned away from an interview protocol employing
hypothetical moral dilemmas laden with Kohlbergian justice assumptions, to an open-
ended format that emphasized careful tracking of persons on their own terms, in the
context of exploring stories told about real-life situations of moral conﬂict and choice (see
Gilligan & Attanucci, 1988; Gilligan, Ward, & Taylor, 1988; Gilligan & Wiggins, 1987).
Although Gilligan’s argument about gender differences in moral development has gen-
eratedthemostdiscussionanddebate,aswellasconﬂictingempiricalﬁndings(seeBaum-
rind, 1986; Brabeck, 1983; Gilligan & Attanucci, 1988; Gilligan & Wiggins, 1987; Pratt,
Golding,&Hunter,1984;Walker,1984,1986),itishercentralinsightthateverydaymoral
language (not “deep structures” of moral cognition) holds the key to understanding moral
experienceandmoraldevelopmentthatis,intheend,mostprovocative.Foritisthisinsight
that opened the way to the sociocultural exploration of the centrality of words, language,
and forms of discourse—particularly narrative (story telling)—in human moral life. This
perspective assumes, therefore, that moral thoughts, feelings, and actions are semiotically
mediated, and thus socioculturally situated. As such, it necessarily entails an explicitly di-
alogical conception of the moral self—a conception of the moral self, that is, generated by
am ove away from a paradigm of cognitive representations and internally held principles,
wherein the self is assumed to be a disembodied, transcendental, epistemic subject (see
Kohlberg, 1984), toward a paradigm of social construction and intersubjectively possible
forms of discourse, wherein the self is assumed to be a shared and/or distributed product
of social relations and communicative practices (see Day & Tappan, 1996).
This perspective, as it has been gradually articulated over the past decade, draws cen-
trally from primary scholarship in the “sociocultural” tradition—particularly the work
of Vygotsky (1934/1987, 1978, 1981a, 1981b).1 In recent years a number of scholars,
inspired by Vygotsky’s insights, have focused sustained attention on the ways in which
“mediational means” both physical tools and “psychological” or “semiotic” tools (pri-
marily language), appropriated from the social world, necessarily shape human mental
functioning (see Wertsch, 1985, 1991, 1998; also see Bruner, 1986; Cole, 1996; Rogoff,
1990). From this starting point, a sociocultural perspective has been applied to a number
ofspeciﬁcissuesandproblemsinhumandevelopmentandeducation(seeBerk&Winsler,
1995; Diaz & Berk, 1992; Forman, Minick, & Stone, 1993; Martin, Nelson, & Tobach,
1995; Moll, 1990; Rogoff & Wertsch, 1984; Tharp & Gallimore, 1988; Wertsch, 1986).
Part of this effort has been to move beyond theories that assume the processes, dynamics,
andendpointsofhumandevelopmentareuniversal—transculturalandahistorical—toward
an explicit consideration of the role that the social–cultural–historical–institutional con-
text plays in giving rise to human action and interaction (see Bruner, 1986, 1990; Cole,
1988, 1996; Jahoda, 1992; Packer & Tappan, 2001; Rogoff, 1990; Rogoff & Chavajay,
1995; Rogoff & Lave, 1984; Shweder, 1991; Stigler, Shweder, & Herdt, 1990; Turiel,
2002; Valsiner, 1998; Wertsch, del Rio, & Alvarez, 1995; Winegar & Valsiner, 1992).
Similarly, scholars from a wide range of disciplines have turned to the work of Bakhtin
(1981, 1984, 1986, 1990) to illuminate the dialogic character of all words, language, and
1Thetermsocioculturalisusedinthischaptertodescribetheseapproaches,followingWertsch(1985,1989,
1991,1998;Wertschetal.,1995),mindful,insodoing,thatthereareothertermscurrentlyinusetodescribethe
same approach: “cultural-historical activity theory” (see Cole, 1996), “cultural-historical theory” (see van der
Veer & Valsiner, 1991), “sociohistorical theory” (see Cole, 1988; Rogoff, 1990), and “neo-Vygotskian” theory
(see Tharp & Gallimore, 1988), among others.P1: IML
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forms of discourse; and hence the fundamentally dialogical nature of the self (see Clark
& Holquist, 1984; Emerson, 1986; Hermans & Kempen, 1993; Hermans, Kempen, & van
Loon, 1992; Holquist, 1990; Morson & Emerson, 1990; Sampson, 1993a; Wertsch, 1991;
Wortham, 2001). Bakhtin was a contemporary of Vygotsky, and although it is doubtful
that they ever met, their work shares many fundamental similarities (see Wertsch, 1991).
Moreover, as Taylor (1991) argues, Bakhtin’s insights are critical to a conception of the
self that accurately captures the dialogical realities of everyday life:
Childrenplainlyneedrecognition,conﬁrmation,lovetogrowandbeinductedintoadultlife,at
thelimiteventosurvive.Butthiscanbeconceivedasamonologicalneed,acomfortthatthey
have to receive from others, as they depend on others for food, but that can only contingently
come through conversation. Or it can be seen as a need that is essentially fulﬁlled in a certain
form of conversation itself. This latter understanding places dialogue at the very center of
our understanding of human life, an indispensable key to its comprehension, and requires a
transformed understanding of language. In order to follow up this line of thinking, we need
not Mead and his like, but rather Bakhtin. Human beings are constituted in conversation; and
hence what gets internalized in the mature subject is not the reaction of others, but the whole
conversation, with the interanimation of its voices. Only a theory of this kind can do justice
to the dialogical nature of the self. (pp. 313–314)
A sociocultural/dialogical perspective also resonates with, and reﬂects, the so-called
discursive turn in the social sciences, in general, and the ﬁeld of psychology, in particular,
that has been underway for some time now (see, for example, Billig, 1987; Bruner, 1986,
1990;Edwards&Potter,1992;Gergen,1982,1985,1991,1994;Harre,1984;Parker,1992;
Sampson, 1993a, 1993b; Shotter, 1990; Shotter & Gergen, 1989). Deﬁning discourse as
anything that humans do in their everyday lives that involves speaking (Parker, 1992),
and focusing on the central role that speaking, talking, and conversing play in human
life, discourse theorists (also called “social constructionists” [see Gergen, 1985, 1994])
“maintain that talk is constitutive of the realities in which we live, rather than expressive
of an earlier, discourse-independent reality” (Sampson, 1993b, p. 1221). Moreover, on
this view, both language and communication are necessarily shared practices that give
rise to the various realities one encounters in everyday life. Because discourse is not
the possession of a single individual, but must always be the product of a social and
communicative relationship wherein both parties agree on the meaning of the words that
pass between them, it follows that “it is not the mind of the single individual that provides
whatever certitude we possess [about the world in which we live], but relationships of
interdependency” (Gergen, 1994, p. viii).
Mindful of this rich and ever-changing scholarly and intellectual context, the purpose
of this chapter, again, is to summarize the central elements of a sociocultural/dialogical
perspective on the study of moral development, and to review a variety of theoretical and
empiricalapproachesthathaveemergedunderitsrelativelybroadpurviewoverthecourse
of the past decade or so. It is also ﬁtting that these approaches be considered in a volume
such as this one, marking the ﬁeld of moral development’s move into a new millennium.
A sociocultural/dialogical perspective on moral development begins with three claims
that capture the fundamental assumptions of Vygotsky’s sociocultural psychology:
1. The claim that higher mental functions (mental functions, like decision making, problem
solving, deliberate memory, that are not biologically or instinctually motivated) can only
be understood when one analyzes and interprets them genetically or developmentally;P1: IML
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2. The claim that higher mental functioning is mediated by words, language, and forms of
discourse,whichfunctionas“psychologicaltools”thatbothfacilitateandtransformmental
action; and
3. The claim that forms of higher mental functioning have their origins in social relations,
as “intermental” processes between persons are internalized to become “intramental” pro-
cesses within persons (Wertsch, 1985, pp. 14–16; see also Berk & Winsler, 1995; Kozulin,
1990; van der Veer & Valsiner, 1991).
When these claims are extended and elaborated, four principles or assumptions
emerge that characterize various sociocultural/dialogical approaches to the study of moral
development—assumptions that build on and extend central aspects of the theoretical and
empirical work of both Vygotsky and Bakhtin:
1. Moral functioning (like all “higher psychological functioning”) is necessarily mediated by
words, language, and forms of discourse;
2. Such mediation occurs primarily in private or inner speech, in the form of inner moral
dialogue;
3. Processes of social communication and social relations necessarily give rise to moral
functioning; and
4. Moraldevelopmentisalwaysshapedbytheparticularsocial,cultural,andhistoricalcontext
in which it occurs (see Tappan, 1997).
This chapter is organized around each of these four principles or assumptions. Each
one is summarized, and relevant theoretical and empirical work is reviewed, in turn. The
chapter then concludes with a number of questions for further inquiry and investigation,
both theoretical and empirical.
THE SEMIOTIC MEDIATION OF MORAL FUNCTIONING
Perhaps the central idea in Vygotsky’s (1934/1987, 1978) theoretical perspective is the
notionthat,tounderstandthemind,wemustunderstandthe“tools”thatmediateandshape
its functioning (see Wertsch, 1985). Although physical (“technical”) tools are certainly
important in this process, Vygotsky was most interested in the role that “psychological
tools,”or“signs,”playinhumanmentallife.Ultimately,Vygotskyfocusedhisattentionon
language as the most important psychological tool. Psychological tools, like language, do
not simply facilitate the operation of existing mental tasks, argued Vygotsky. Instead, the
introductionofnewpsychologicaltools(e.g.,whennewwordsarelearned)fundamentally
transforms and reorganizes mental functioning.
This transformation is particularly critical in early childhood, of course, when, with
the advent of egocentric speech (as an intermediate step toward inner speech), language
begins to be used as an “instrument of thought” in its own right, a “tool” that helps the
child plan activities and solve problems:
The most signiﬁcant moment in the course of intellectual development, which gives birth
to the purely human forms of practical and abstract intelligence, occurs when speech and
practical activity, two previously independent lines of development, converge. (Vygotsky,
1978, p. 24)P1: IML
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Thus, Vygotsky’s conception of semiotic mediation also shapes his view of the develop-
mental process: he does not envision ontogenesis as a series of incremental quantitative
changes, but rather as a series of fundamental qualitative transformations or “revolutions”
associatedwithchangesinthepsychologicaltoolstowhichthepersonhasaccess(Wertsch,
1985).
The assumption that moral functioning (like all “higher psychological functioning”)
is necessarily mediated by words, language, and forms of discourse is central to a so-
ciocultural perspective on the process of moral development. Moral functioning is the
higher psychological process (in Vygotsky’s terms) that a person invokes to respond to
and resolve a speciﬁc problem, conﬂict, or dilemma that requires a moral decision and a
moral action—that is, when one is faced with the question “What is the ‘right’ or ‘moral’
thing to do in this situation?”
Theconceptofmediationiscriticalhere,becauseforanactiontobeconsidered“moral,”
either by an actor or by an observer, a particular meaning must be associated with that
action. This holds whether that action is as “instinctive” as rushing out into busy trafﬁc
to rescue a wayward child, or as “deliberative” as weighing the pros and cons of having
an abortion. In either case, and in many others, because the designation “moral” is an
interpretation of the action in question, generated from the shared assumptions and un-
derstandings that constitute culture, moral functioning can never be unmediated. Rather,
it is always accomplished with the use of what Vygotsky called “psychological tools”
(most importantly, words, language, and forms of moral discourse) that enable the per-
son to think, feel, and act in a particular way—that is, in a way that, in her particular
sociocultural context, is understood to be “moral,” “right,” “good,” and so on.
Thecrucialelementhere,fromasocioculturalperspective,isthelinkbetweenmorality
and language—language, that is, used not merely to express moral meaning, but used,
primarily,tocreatemoralmeaningintheﬁrstplace.Thisisalinkthatismadeexplicitlyby
the philosopher Oakeshott (1975; see also Bellah, Madsen, Sullivan, Swindler, & Tipton,
1985; MacIntyre, 1981; Stout, 1988). Oakeshott argues that morality is fundamentally a
“practice”oraformof“conduct”thatfacilitateshumaninteraction:“Theconditionswhich
compose a moral practice are not theorems or precepts about human conduct, nor do they
constitute anything so speciﬁc as a ‘shared system of values’; they compose a vernacular
language of colloquial intercourse” (1975, p. 63; my emphasis). This language, claims
Oakeshott, is thus fundamentally pragmatic; it is a tool
likeanyotherlanguage,itisaninstrumentofself-disclosureusedbyagentsindiagnosingtheir
situationsandinchoosingtheirresponses;anditisalanguageofself-enactmentwhichpermits
those who can use it to understand themselves and one another, to disclose to one another
their complex individualities, and to explore relationships far more varied and interesting
than those it has a name for or those which a commonplace acceptance of so-called ‘moral
values’ would allow (1975, p. 63).
From Oakeshott’s (1975) perspective, therefore, morality itself is a cultural tool that
enables those who use it to accomplish certain things:
Amorality,then,isneitherasystemofgeneralprinciplesnoracodeofrules,butavernacular
language.Generalprinciplesandevenrulesmaybeelicitedfromit,but(likeotherlanguages)
it is not the creation of grammarians; it is made by speakers. What has to be learned in a
moral education [therefore] is not a theorem such as that good conduct is acting fairly or
being charitable, nor is it a rule such as ‘always tell the truth,’ but how speak the language
intelligently. (pp. 78–79)P1: IML
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Duncan (2001) has outlined a conception of moral development based on Vygotsky’s
(1934/1987)theoryofconceptformationthatechoesmanyoftheseassumptionsaboutthe
natureofmorality.HisprimaryargumentisthatVygotsky’stheoryofconceptformation,in
whichthechildmovesfromusing“syncreticheaps,”tothinkingin“complexes,”totheuse
of“potentialconcepts,”canbeusedasamodelforunderstandingthedevelopmentofmoral
ability. On Duncan’s view, however, moral ability is not understood as “rule-following
behavior.” Rather, he deﬁnes moral ability, like concept formation, as a “present-centered
aptitude for creating meaning” (p. 113). As such, he argues, both conceptual thinking,
on Vygotsky’s view, and moral ability, are activities that “use the tools of individual
intelligence and interpersonal discourse (thought and language) to create something that
is not determined by these tools” (p. 118).
Althoughnotembarkedonasocioculturallyinspiredresearchprogram,perse,Gilligan
(1982, 1983) and her colleagues have presented very compelling evidence regarding the
ways in which moral languages and forms of moral discourse mediate and shape persons’
responses to moral problems, conﬂicts, and dilemmas in their lives. In identifying the two
different moral voices of “justice” and “care,” Gilligan and her colleagues have shown
how these two voices represent different ways of speaking about the world of human
relationships, different ways of describing and understanding moral problems, and differ-
ent approaches to and strategies for resolving such problems (see Gilligan, 1982, 1983;
Gilligan, Ward, & Taylor, 1988; Gilligan & Wiggins, 1987).
Gilligan and her colleagues have also developed a method for identifying these voices
in persons’ narratives of real-life moral conﬂict and choice—the “Listening Guide” (see
Brown, Debold, Tappan, & Gilligan, 1992; Brown & Gilligan, 1991; Brown, Tappan,
Gilligan, Miller, & Argyris, 1989). In addition, Gilligan and Attanucci (1988) report that
when asked to describe a moral problem or conﬂict they had recently faced, more than
two-thirds of a group of 80 educationally advantaged adolescents and adults living in the
U.S. represented the voices of both justice and care in their interview narratives. This
ﬁnding, and others reported by Gilligan and Attanucci, suggests that (a) justice and care
represent two fundamentally different moral languages or forms of moral discourse; (b)
persons can speak in the language of both justice and care; and (c) persons therefore can
and do use both voices to mediate the process of moral functioning, and thus to help them
respond to moral problems and conﬂicts in their lives.
Tappan (2003) has extended the work of Wertsch (1998) to argue that moral func-
tioning, in its cognitive, affective, and active dimensions, should be understood to be,
fundamentally and irreducibly, mediated action. Mediated action, according to Wertsch
(1998), entails two central elements: an “agent” (the person who is doing the acting), and
speciﬁc “cultural tools” or “mediational means” (the tools, means, or instruments [both
physical and psychological], appropriated from the social world, and then used by the
agent to accomplish the action in question). Moral functioning considered as a form of
mediated action thus entails focusing on both the agent and the cultural tools/mediational
meanssheorheemploysinrespondingtothemoralproblem,conﬂict,ordilemmaathand.
In addition, Tappan (1999, 2000, 2005) has drawn on the work of Penuel and Wertsch
(1995),whoextendedtheconceptofmediatedactiontotherealmofidentitydevelopment,
and Bakhtin (1981), who described identity development as a process of “ideological
becoming,”toarticulateasociocultural/dialogicalconceptionofmoralidentity.According
to Tappan, moral identity must be seen not as primarily a psychological understanding
of oneself as a moral person that comes from access to or reﬂection on one’s “true” or
“essential” self (see Blasi, 1984; Damon & Hart, 1988), but rather as a sociocultural
process that takes the form of “mediated moral action”—action that is shaped by speciﬁcP1: IML
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cultural tools and resources. Chief among these tools and resources are moral orientations
or ideologies that are carried and transmitted via words, language, and forms of discourse.
One ﬁnds one’s moral identity, therefore, in the ideologically mediated moral action in
which one engages, not in the process of reﬂection on one’s inner moral self. And the
development of moral identity, on this view, entails a process of “ideological becoming,”
wherebyoneselectivelyappropriatesthewords,language,andformsofdiscourseofothers
withwhomoneisindialogue,andinsodoingstrugglestostrikeahealthybalancebetween
“authoritative” and “internally persuasive” forms of discourse (see Bakhtin, 1981).
Lightfoot (1997, 2002a, 2002b, 2003) has also used Bakhtin’s (1981) distinction be-
tween authoritative and internally persuasive discourse to analyze the phenomenon of
adolescent risk taking, particularly its moral dimensions. Lightfoot (1997) argues, specif-
ically, that adolescent risk taking must be seen as a form of text construction through
which different moral discourses and perspectives come into dialogical contact. As such,
engagement with another’s discourse contributes directly to the further development and
articulation of one’s social identity, as well as the awareness that one has a social iden-
tity of moral consequence. Lightfoot suggests, therefore, that adolescent risk-taking often
represents a struggle between various forms of authoritative discourse as they seek to
differentiate themselves from their parents, and to forge a separate, distinct, and “au-
tonomous”moralidentity.Asaresult,thisstrugglebetweenvariousformsofauthoritative
discourse, moreover, often leads to the formation of a more internally persuasive form of
“ideological consciousness” (i.e., identity):
Although adolescents’ risk-taking can be construed in terms of a struggle with the authori-
tative discourse of another, it is also a mechanism for creating a discourse of their own, the
internally persuasive one that Bakhtin wrote of. By these lights, the reﬂective awareness that
is engendered, the coming into ideological consciousness that follows in the wake of such
struggle, is coupled alectically to processes of sociocultural identiﬁcation. Untanglings and
entanglements; engagement with another’s point of view is the fountainhead of mindedness.
(pp. 113–114)
Ifmoralfunctioningandactivity(likeall“higherpsychologicalfunctioning”)isindeed
mediated by words, language, and forms of discourse, then inner speech, and inner dia-
logue, must play a primary role in that process. This issue has been addressed by a variety
of sociocultural/dialogical approaches to moral development.
SEMIOTIC MEDIATION IN INNER MORAL DIALOGUE
Vygotsky (1934/1987, 1978) explored a variety of means by which mental life is semioti-
callymediated.Intheend,asindicated,hefocusedprimaryattentiononthewaysinwhich
language, particularly in the form of inner speech, functions as a psychological tool. Just,
therefore, as children learn to count ﬁrst by using ﬁngers, blocks, or other objects before
beingabletocountintheirheads,theylearntospeakﬁrsttoothersbeforelearningtospeak
tothemselves,inprivate,innerspeech.Oncethisisaccomplished,however,verbalthought
becomes possible, the nature of development changes from being biologically determined
to being socioculturally shaped, and there is a radical shift in the richness and complexity
of consciousness (Vygotsky, 1934/1987; see also Diaz & Berk, 1992; Kohlberg, Yaeger,
& Hjertholm, 1968; Zivin, 1979).
Although it is unclear whether Vygotsky viewed monologue or dialogue as the fun-
damental characteristic of inner speech, the work of Bakhtin (1981) and his colleagueP1: IML
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Volosinov (1929/1986) can be used to extend Vygotsky’s insights, by focusing, explicitly,
onthedialogicnatureofinnerspeech(seealsoEmerson,1986;Morson&Emerson,1990).
For Bakhtin and Volosinov, inner speech never consists of pure monologue, in which a
personsimplytalksinasingle,solitary“voice.”Rather,thereisalwaysadialoguebetween
at least two voices—a dialogue that mediates and shapes human mental functioning in
profound ways.
Bakhtin (1981) focuses on the fundamentally dialogic character of all speech:
In the makeup of almost every utterance spoken by a social person—from a brief response
in a casual dialogue to major verbal-ideological works (literary, scholarly and others)—a
signiﬁcant number of words can be identiﬁed that are implicitly or explicitly admitted as
someone else’s, and that are transmitted by a variety of different means. Within the arena of
almost every utterance an intense interaction between one’s own and another’s word is being
waged, a process in which they oppose or dialogically interanimate each other. (pp. 354–
355)
Volosinov (1929/1986) focuses explicitly on the dialogic character of inner speech:
Close analysis would show that the units of which inner speech is constituted resemble the
alternating lines of a dialogue. There was good reason [therefore] why thinkers in ancient
times should have conceived of inner speech as inner dialogue. (p. 38; emphasis in original)
Tappan (1997) has extended Vygotsky’s (1934/1987) general view of the relationship
between inner speech and thinking to the realm of moral development, by arguing that
when a person (child, adolescent, or adult) is faced with a moral problem, conﬂict, or
dilemma, she or he responds to it by means of inner speech as inner moral dialogue—by
talking through the solution to her- or himself—just as she or he responds to any other
problem or task with which she or he is faced. Moreover, following Vygotsky, Tappan
predicts that such inner moral dialogue should exhibit the same “peculiar” syntactic and
semantic characteristics of inner speech. Thus, inner moral dialogue should consist pri-
marily of predicates and other such abbreviated sentence structures. These characteristics,
moreover, should contribute to the formation of an idiomatic moral language that consti-
tutestheprimarymediumforinnermoralspeech,andthusthemeansbywhichinnermoral
dialogues are conducted–similar, as such, to Oakeshott’s (1975) conception of morality
as a vernacular or colloquial language.
In addition, Gilligan and Attannucci’s (1988) ﬁnding that most persons represent both
the moral voice of justice and the moral voice of care in their narratives of moral conﬂict
and choice illuminates well the fundamentally dialogical relationship that appears to exist
between these two vernacular moral voices. Moreover, many persons describe their own
participation,literally,inanongoinginnerdialoguebetweenthesetwovoices—thejustice
voicespeakingthelanguageoffairnessandequality,advocatingonesolution,andthecare
voicespeakingthelanguageofrelationshipandresponsibility,advocatinganother.Aftera
time, and depending on how the dialogue has proceeded, the person makes a decision, and
respondstothemoralproblemathand.Thissuggeststhatpersonsarenotonlypolyphonic
or multivocal in their moral utterances at any one time (Bakhtin, 1981), but also that
they can, and frequently do, oscillate from one voice to another when responding to and
resolving moral problems, conﬂicts, and dilemmas in their lives (see also Brown et al.,
1992; Brown & Gilligan, 1991; Brown et al., 1989).P1: IML
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Day (1991) provides additional empirical evidence in support of the view that multiple
voices, multiple forms of reasoning, characterize the moral life, both within persons and
across the communities they compose. Arguing that moral life is not only storied, but
also distinctly theatrical, he explores the phenomenon of the “moral audience”—the ways
in which children, adolescents, and adults, in the course of telling stories about their
lived moral experience, identify others (real and imagined, alive and dead) that compose
an “internalized” audience before whom they act, and by whom they are judged. For
the persons in Day’s study, moral action always occurs in relationship to other persons;
hence actions are always performed and interpreted in terms of these persons as audience.
Consistency of moral action thus has much to do with the consistency of the audience to
which such actions are played. Moral principles are developed and sustained, or changed,
in relation to the parties who compose the audience, and moral actions are mentally
rehearsed before them. Moral actions are then retrospectively analyzed and evaluated in
terms of the same audience. Day argues, therefore, that we can understand both moral
judgment and moral action only when we can grasp the nature of the actor’s relationship
to the audience(s) before whom she or her most centrally acts. He also suggests that moral
development must be understood in terms of the formation and transformation of moral
audiences in the experience of moral actors across the lifespan.
The work of Gilligan and her colleagues, Day, and others also highlights the critical
importance of narrative in the self-reports of interviewees representing their inner moral
dialogues in response to real-life moral conﬂicts and dilemmas. A number of researchers
have explored the variety of ways persons rely on narrative and story telling to chart, carry
out, evaluate, and justify the actions they take when confronted with such dilemmas (At-
tanucci, 1991; Day & Tappan, 1996; Johnston, 1991; Lyons, 1983; Tappan, 1991a, 1991b;
Tappan & Brown, 1989; Tappan & Packer, 1991; Ward, 1991; Witherell & Edwards,
1991; Witherell & Noddings, 1991). There is, in fact, a growing consensus that because
moral experience, like all lived experience, always occurs in time and in relationship (the
fundamental dimensions of narrative [see Gilligan, Brown, & Rogers, 1990]), whenever
a person has to report “what really happened,” the natural impulse is to tell a story, to
compose a narrative that recounts the actions and events of interest in some kind of tem-
poralsequence(seealsoBruner,1986;Mischler,1986;Polkinghorne,1988;Sarbin,1986,
1990).
A recent and very promising empirical exploration and elaboration of these dialogical
and narrative insights has been undertaken by Mkhize (2003). Studying indigenous South
AfricanisiZuluspeakers’conceptionofmorality,Mkhizeinterviewed52participants(both
womenandmen)livinginurban,suburban,andruralareasofKwaZulu-Natal.Participants
wereaskedtotellastoryaboutamoralconﬂictordilemmaintheirlives,andthenarratives
were analyzed using a modiﬁcation of the Listening Guide developed by Gilligan and her
colleagues(seeBrown&Gilligan,1991).Mkhizefoundthatconceptionsofmoralitywere
related to participants’ understanding of the self. The view that morality is characterized
by connection was associated mainly with what Mkhize calls a “communal” or “familial”
self, which was the most common conception of self in the isuZulu cultural context.
But Mkhize also identiﬁed tensions between competing conceptions of the self within
persons—tensions, that is, between the communal self and the independent self. These
dialogical tensions, moreover, complicated participants’ responses to moral conﬂicts and
dilemmas in their lives.
These various approaches illustrate well the ways in which moral functioning is me-
diated primarily through inner speech as inner moral dialogue, and represented in nar-
rative. Yet they also raise questions regarding the ways in which processes of socialP1: IML
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communication and social relations give rise, via the medium of language, to moral func-
tioning in the ﬁrst place.
THE SOCIAL ORIGINS OF MORAL FUNCTIONING
The notion that all higher mental functions have their origin in communicative processes
andsocialrelationsisanotherkeyelementofVygotsky’stheoreticalframework(Wertsch,
1985). Vygotsky’s view here is captured most succinctly in what Wertsch (1985) calls his
“general genetic law of cultural development”:
Any function in the child’s cultural development appears twice, or on two planes. First it ap-
pearsonthesocialplane,andthenonthepsychologicalplane.Firstitappearsbetweenpeople
as an interpsychological [intermental] category, and then within the child as an intrapsycho-
logical [intramental] category. This is equally true with regard to voluntary attention, logical
memory, the formation of concepts, and the development of volition. We may consider this
position as a law in the full sense of the word, but it goes without saying that internaliza-
tion transforms the process itself and changes its structure and functions. Social relations
or relations among people genetically underlie all higher functions and their relationships.
(Vygotsky, 1981a, p. 163)
Keyt othis process is the phenomenon of internalization, in which “an operation that
initially represents an external activity is reconstructed and begins to appear internally”
(Vygotsky, 1978, pp. 56–57). As such, Vygotsky’s approach provides a developmental
perspective not only on the ways in which such higher mental functions as thinking,
reasoning, remembering, and willing are mediated by language and other semiotic mech-
anisms, but also on how such functions necessarily have their origins in the interpersonal
relationships that constitute human social life.
From a sociocultural perspective, moral development must entail the internalization
of semiotically and linguistically mediated social relations, as external speech becomes
inner speech—that is, as overt, external dialogue becomes silent, inner dialogue. This
process has been illustrated elegantly by Bhatia (2000) in his exploration of the critical
role that language-based socialization strategies and patterns employed by caregivers play
in children’s construction of what he calls “sociomoral meanings.” Bhatia studied Hindi-
speaking Indian caregivers interacting with their children; he focuses particular attention
on the ways in which children’s participation in dialogical and narrative practices enable
them to begin to understand cultural conceptions of morality. Declarative, directive, and
interrogative communicative patterns and forms of discourse all play central roles in this
process, according to Bhatia:
Hindi-speaking care-givers use social acts to foreground certain aspects of their socio-moral
order.Care-givers,throughdirectivessuchas“behaveproperly”or“recitethepoemtoaunty”
anddeclarativessuchas“thisisbadlanguage”are...indexingwhatOchs(1996)hasreferred
to as epistemic stances about one’s culture. These “epistemic stances: carry important con-
textual information related to roles, status, social obligations and duty, and provide material
from which the construction of socio-moral meanings occurs. (p. 164)
Finally, Bhatia (2000) concludes with these reﬂections on the relationship between lan-
guage,humandevelopment,andmoralitythatformsthecoreofasocioculturalperspective
on moral development:P1: IML
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[L]anguage as a symbolic form allows human beings to articulate their experiences in a
meaningful way. At one level, one may conceive of these forms in terms of “symbols and
referents,” but at a deeper level, everyday cultural discourse provides a novel language: a
language of morals and ethics through which children come to understand what it means to
be human. (164)
Similarly,Dunn’s(1987)worksuggeststhatchildrenbegintolearnfromparents,grand-
parents, caregivers, and even older siblings about social rules, standards of behavior, and
theeffectoftheiractionsonothers’feelingsinthesecondyearoflife.Moreover,thislearn-
ing occurs primarily in the context of conversation, as adults and children begin to talk
with each other about “right” and “wrong,” “good” and “bad,” “should” and “shouldn’t”
(Snow, 1987). Dunn (1987) also reports high correlations between the frequency of ma-
ternal talk about feelings to 18-month-olds and subsequent talk about inner states by these
children at 24 months.
Fromasocioculturalperspective,therefore,whatisinitiallycommunicationforandwith
others regarding rules, standards, and the consequences of their transgression gradually,
as a result of communicative interactions over the course of a number of years, becomes
communication with oneself regarding what one should and should not do in a given
situation:“ininnerspeechculturallyprescribedformsoflanguageandreasoningﬁndtheir
individualized realization....[as] culturally sanctioned symbolic systems are remodeled
into individualized verbal thought” (Kozulin, 1986, p. xxxvi). Children, therefore, as
Vygotsky predicted, do not simply make internal what was once external, but also both
create and transform their own internal plane of moral thinking, feeling, and acting, based
on their experiences in the social world.
Another clear description of this process at work in the preschool context has been
provided by Buzzelli and Johnston (Buzzelli, 1993; Buzzelli & Johnston, 2001, 2002;
Johnston & Buzzelli, 2002). Buzzelli and Johnston study the ways in which children
internalizemoralnorms,andthenusethesenormstoguidetheirownbehavior.Insodoing,
Buzzelli and Johnston employ an explicitly sociocultural framework to illuminate how
interpersonal dialogue between children and teachers is transformed into inner dialogue
that children use for “self-regulation”:
An important part of children’s moral understanding is formed through dialogue with adults
whointerpretandframeeventsandruleswithinamoralcontextthatreﬂectstheirownunique
perspective....[T]his process is a social one inﬂuenced by the words adults use in their
dialogue with children.... For example, the teacher might ask the child “Is that toy yours?”
“Who does it belong to?” “Did you take it?” “What is the rule about taking things that belong
to others?” Another teacher may approach the situation differently by asking “Where did you
getthattoy?”“Didyouﬁndit?”“Doesitbelongtoanotherchild?”“Whatdoesitmeantotake
at oy that belongs to someone else?” “How do you think the other child feels?” In the second
example each question asked is based upon the child’s response to the previous question.
The two examples represent different types of questioning within adult–child dialogue. It is
throughsuchinteractions,byquestioningandresponding,thatadultandchildcreateashared
meaning of the behavior which serves as the basis for the child’s moral norm concerning the
behavior. (Buzzelli, 1993, p. 383)
Buzzellialsoargues,followingBakhtin(1981),thatencouragingchildrento“retell”moral
rules in their own words (using internally persuasive discourse) provides the basis for a
morepositivetypeofmoralself-regulationthansimplyaskingchildrento“recite”therulesP1: IML
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by heart (using the authoritative words of adults—parents or teachers) (see also Tappan,
1991a).
Thesesocioculturalperspectivesonmoraldevelopmentsuggestthatprocessesofsocial
communication and social relations necessarily give rise to moral functioning. Social
interaction,however,alwaystakesplaceinthecontextofculture.Thus,moraldevelopment
is necessarily shaped by the particular social, cultural, and historical context in which it
occurs.
THE SOCIOCULTURAL CONTEXT OF MORAL DEVELOPMENT
There is a fundamental connection between human mental functioning and the social,
cultural, and historical contexts in which it occurs. This assumption follows directly from
the central tenets of Vygotsky’s theoretical framework (Wertsch, 1985, 1991). Consider,
for example, Vygotsky’s (1934/1987) claim that “thought development is determined by
language, i.e., by the linguistic tools of thought and by the sociocultural experience of the
child” (p. 94). In addition, Vygotsky argues that with the onset of inner speech and verbal
thought in early childhood comes a dramatic shift in the nature of development, “from
biological to sociohistorical...[because] [v]erbal thought is not an innate, natural form
of behavior, but is determined by a historical-cultural process and has speciﬁc properties
and laws that cannot be found in the natural forms of thought and speech” (p. 94).
Despite the importance of these assumptions, claims, and arguments to his research
program, Vygotsky never directly addressed many of the critical issues to which they
give rise. Speciﬁcally, because Vygotsky’s own analyses did not move beyond the level
of intermental processes, “he did little to spell out how speciﬁc historical, cultural, and
institutional settings are tied to various forms of mediated action” (Wertsch, 1991, p. 46).
Nevertheless, a genuinely “sociocultural approach to mind” can be developed quite easily
on the basis of Vygotsky’s theoretical insights:
Inordertoformulateamorecomprehensivesocioculturalapproachtomentalfunctioningone
should identify historically, culturally, and institutionally situated forms of mediated [inter-
mental] action and specify how their mastery leads to particular forms of mediated action on
the intramental plane. This amounts to extending Vygotsky’s ideas to bring the sociocultural
situatedness of mediated action on the intermental plan to the fore. It is the sociocultural
situatedness of mediated action that provides the essential link between the cultural, histor-
ical, and institutional setting on the one hand and the mental functioning of the individual
on the other. (Wertsch, 1991, p. 49)
The development of moral functioning, therefore, like the development of all forms of
highermentalfunctioning,isnecessarilyandinescapablysocioculturallysituated.Assuch,
moraldevelopmentisshapedbysocial,cultural,historical,andinstitutionalforces,because
thevariousformsofintermentalfunctioningthatgiverisetointramentalprocessesofmoral
functioning are mediated by words, language, and forms of discourse that are similarly
shaped and contextualized. As the studies reviewed in the previous section illustrate well,
the words that a young child uses to help her understand that her actions are “right” or
“wrong,” “good” or “bad,” come out of a speciﬁc social, cultural, and linguistic milieu.
Moreover,thetypesofconversationsandinteractionsinwhichparentsandchildrenengage
around standards and their transgression are always culturally and historically determined
(see Bhatia, 2000; Dunn, 1987; Snow, 1987).P1: IML
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Bellah and associates (1985), whose work focuses on exploring the ways in which
Americans talk about moral issues and moral concerns, in both the public and private
spheres of their lives, provide additional evidence supporting the claim that moral devel-
opmentissocioculturallysituated(aswellassemioticallymediated).Keytotheiranalysis
is a notion of language that is similar to that used by other sociocultural theorists:
We use the term [language] to refer to modes of moral discourse that include distinct vocab-
ularies and characteristic patterns of moral reasoning. We use ﬁrst language to refer to the
individualistic mode that is the dominant American form of discourse about moral, social,
and political matters. We use the term second languages to refer to other forms, primarily
biblical and republican, that provide at least part of the moral discourse of most Americans.
(p. 334)
It is useful, in this context, to link the work of Bellah and co-workers (1985) to that of
Gilligan (1982) and her colleagues. In so doing, it becomes clear that the moral voices of
justice and care represent two prominent social/moral languages in American culture, at
this time in our history. The discourse of justice, fairness, and individual rights has been,
and continues to be, the predominant moral language in the U.S.—our “ﬁrst language.” It
is the language in which our most important historical moral documents are written (e.g.,
the Declaration of Independence, the Constitution, and the Bill of Rights), and it is the
language that constitutes our modern-day legal system. As such, it is the language that
frames the bulk of our public discussions about morality and moral decision making—
from discussions about abortion (is a mother’s “right” to free choice more important than
a fetus’ “right” to life?) to discussions about euthanasia (is a patient’s “right” to die more
important than a doctor’s “obligation” to sustain life?).
The discourse of care, compassion, and responsibility in relationships, in contrast, has
been, and continues to be, one of our “second languages.” Historically it has not occupied
a predominant place in our public moral discourse; and when it has entered into the public
sphere it has often been denigrated and devalued (see, for example, Kohlberg & Kramer,
1969). But the language of care has always occupied a predominant place in the private
livesandrelationshipsofAmericans—particularlythroughthelanguageofcaregiversand
caregiving as it has been spoken by mothers and others responsible for childcare, nurses,
social workers, among others. One of the consequences of the work of Gilligan and her
colleagues, however, has been not only to identify the care voice as a moral language
typically associated with women and women’s experience, but also to legitimize it as a
language that has an important role to play in transforming public moral, political, and
legal discourse (see also Blum, 1980; Noddings, 1984; Ruddick, 1989).
This view suggests, therefore, that the moral voices of justice and care are certainly
not universal, but are rather socioculturally situated—that they are social/moral languages
that have emerged out of the American culture of the last 20 years (the culture in which
both Gilligan and her colleagues and the children, adolescents, and adults whom they
have interviewed have lived). Moreover, because these moral languages have emerged in
a speciﬁc sociocultural context, a similar effort in another social, cultural, and historical
contextmightwellhaveidentiﬁedverydifferentmoralvoices,morallanguages,andtypes
of moral discourse.
Similar questions about the degree to which Kohlberg’s (1981, 1984) sequence of six
structurally deﬁned stages of reasoning about justice and fairness is cross-culturally
universal (rather than culturally speciﬁc), and thus whether observed cultural differences
in moral judgment represent differences in content (allowed by Kohlberg) or structureP1: IML
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(assumed, by Kohlberg, to be universal), have been raised numerous times over the past
several decades (see Blasi, 1987; Boyes & Walker, 1988; Dien, 1982; Shweder, Maha-
patra, & Miller, 1987; Shweder & Much, 1987; Snarey, 1985; Turiel, 1983). Exempli-
fying these criticisms is Dien’s (1982) argument that Kohlberg’s theory cannot be used
to understand native Chinese moral experience, because Kohlberg’s theory and method
both instantiate “the prevailing Western conception of man [sic] as an autonomous be-
ing, free to make choices and determine his destiny” (p. 339). As such, claims Dien,
Kohlberg’s approach adequately captures neither “the Confucian view of man as an in-
tegral part of an orderly universe with an innate moral sense to maintain harmony,” nor
the preferred mode of conﬂict resolution in China, which focuses on “reconciliation and
collectivedecisionmakingratherthanindividualchoice,commitment,andresponsibility”
(p. 331).
It is important to clarify here that Dien’s criticism is leveled speciﬁcally at Kohlberg’s
theory and research method. There are many other researchers, many of whom also align
themselves with the broader cognitive–developmental paradigm, who have conducted
cross-cultural research that is much more sensitive to local cultural meanings, messages,
interactions, and traditions than is Kohlberg’s approach. Much of this work is represented
herein (see Helwig, chap. 7; Killen, Margic, & Sinno, chap. 6; Nucci, chap. 24; Smetana,
chap. 5; Turiel, chap. 1; and Wainryb, chap. 8, this volume for example).
Of particular relevance, in this regard, is research conducted by Huebner and Garrod
(1991, 1993). Huebner and Garrod studied the moral reasoning of adolescent and young
adult Tibetan Buddhist monks living in a Tibetan Buddhist monastery in Nepal. They
interviewed twenty monks using a “culturally adapted” form of Kohlberg’s hypothetical
Moral Judgment Interview (Colby & Kohlberg, 1987). After transcribing, translating, and
analyzing these interviews, Huebner and Garrod (1993) were able to chart a standard age-
related developmental progression in moral judgment among the monks they interviewed
(movement from a mean stage of 2 or 3 for the young adolescent group to a mean stage of
3o r4for the young adults, based on Kohlberg’s developmental sequence). They found,
however, that it was very difﬁcult to interpret the monks’ moral reasoning using scoring
categories provided by Kohlberg’s scheme, largely because the notion of karma, which
wass ocentral to the Buddhist philosophy and to the worldview of the monks with whom
they talked, was understandably absent in the Standard Issue Scoring Manual (Colby &
Kohlberg, 1987). As a result, Huebner and Garrod (1991) argue, quite forcefully, for the
importance of sociocultural sensitivity in the study of moral development:
Inordertomapthemoraldomainofaculture,wemustﬁrstunderstandthatculture...through
[its] own history, philosophy, and language. Indeed, the importance of language has been
sorely neglected by moral reasoning researchers. More is needed than simply a researcher’s
ability to collect data in subjects’ native language, or even the understanding of “foreign”
concepts (such as karma) that can be brought into our system by the addition of a single new
word to our lexicon. We must strive, too, to understand concepts...that cannot be captured
in direct word-for-word translation. (p. 350)
More recently, Garrod and his colleagues have undertaken a cross-cultural exploration
of the existence of the two moral voices of justice and care (Gilligan, 1982), and the
association of political violence and ethnic conﬂict with these voices, among children
living in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Garrod et al., 2003). The children (age 6 to 12) whom
Garrod and his colleagues interviewed were more likely to offer solutions to dilemmasP1: IML
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involving both animal characters (see Johnston, 1988) and human characters framed in
the care perspective than in the justice perspective. Although these voice-related patterns
resemble, for the most part, those from studies of children living in North America (see
Garrod, Beal, & Shin, 1990), the content of Bosnian children’s responses to both types of
moral dilemmas reﬂected their experience with political displacement and their concerns
about the role of power, physical force, and violence in conﬂict resolution. Here is a brief
example:
CHILD: The cow couldn’t enter the house because the dog was barking. Because
the cow can’t do any harm. I don’t know what should be done.
INTERVIEWER: You can’t think of any solution?
C: Maybe if the cow had strong legs, she could kick him....
I: Would that be good?
C: Yes, because it is her house and she can use force.
I: Can you think of another way to solve the problem?
C: The cow could explain to the dog that it’s the cow’s house and the dog
should just leave. I think the dog should leave because people can expel
each other from their houses (Garrod, et al., 2003, p. 143)
Given these ﬁndings, Garrod and his colleagues conclude with the following caveat, one
that applies not only to their research, but also more broadly: “It is important to focus
not only on the particular moral orientation—justice or care—represented in the solution
that is offered, but also on the content of the children’s responses and the motivation for
their solution, drawn at least in part from the children’s experiences with violence and the
struggle of formerly warring groups to live together” (p. 146).
Fromasocioculturalperspective,boththeconceptofkarmafromtheBuddhisttradition,
and the Bosnian children’s experience with violence and political displacement (“expul-
sion”) are socioculturally signiﬁcant not only because they represent external symbols
that have speciﬁc religious, moral, or political meaning, but also because they function as
semioticresourcesthatmediateandshapemoralthinking,feeling,andacting(seeTappan,
2003). They are, moreover, part of a vernacular moral language whose meaning is shared
by those who share the same cultural activities. Thus, the research of Garrod and his
colleagues illuminates quite clearly how morality is shaped by culture, on the one hand,
and how moral language and forms of moral discourse are shared dialogically, on the
other.
In the end, therefore, sociocultural assumptions about mediation, inner moral dialogue,
thesocialoriginsofmoralfunctioning,andthesocioculturalcontextofmoraldevelopment
come together. If morality is not a naturally occurring universal concept, but is dependent,
instead, on words, language, and forms of discourse, as well as on forms and patterns of
social interaction, all of which are socioculturally speciﬁc, then moral development can
notbeunderstoodastheresultofaconstructiveprocessundertakenbytranscendentalepis-
temicsubjects(Kohlberg’sview).Rather,moraldevelopmentmustbeseenastheoutcome
ofdialogue,socialcommunication,andsocialinteractionbetweenreal,live,speakingper-
sons (not occupants of imaginary “positions,” “original” or otherwise [see Rawls, 1970;
Kohlberg, 1981, 1984])—dialogue, communication, and interaction, moreover, that occur
in speciﬁc social, cultural, and historical contexts and settings.P1: IML
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CONCLUSION
Thischapterhasoutlinedcommoncharacteristicssharedexplicitlysociocultural/dialogical
approachestothestudyofmoraldevelopment.GroundedinVygotsky’s(1934/1987,1978)
empirical and theoretical work on the development of higher mental functioning, and in-
formed by Bakhtin’s (1981) conception of the dialogic nature of all discourse, these ap-
proaches extend Vygotsky’s insights about the semiotic mediation of the mental function-
ing via inner speech (and inner dialogue), the social origins of higher psychological func-
tioning, and the sociocultural situatedness of human development into the realm of moral
development.Assuch,thisperspectivenotonlypointstowardanewaccountoftheprocess
anddynamicsofmoraldevelopment,butalsogivesrisetoanumberofimportantquestions.
Questions about differences in moral development—gender differences, racial differ-
ences, social class differences, cultural differences—lie at the heart of many of the current
debatesintheﬁeldofmoraldevelopment.Thusperhapsitwouldbeusefultofocusonsuch
questions, brieﬂy, and to indicate some of the ways in which a sociocultural/dialogical
perspective addresses them.
Vygotskyclearlyconsidereddifferencesbetweenpersons—forexample,differencesin
reasoning or problem-solving ability—not to be indicators of developmental successes or
failures, measured against a universal standard, but rather to be manifestations of the par-
ticular, and necessarily differential, effects of sociocultural setting on mental functioning
(Wertsch, 1991). From a sociocultural/dialogical perspective, therefore, moral develop-
ment does not occur in the same way, following the same sequence, for all persons around
the globe, but rather it is speciﬁc to unique social, cultural, and historical contexts. More-
over, these unique sociocultural settings may well occur within the conﬁnes of a larger
society, settings deﬁned by those who share similar experiences, values, or social, po-
litical, or economic assumptions (see Bellah et al., 1985; Cortese, 1990; Walker, 2000).
Thus,fromthisperspective,gender,racial,cultural,orsocioeconomicdifferencesinmoral
development, and in the forms of moral functioning, exhibited by members of different
social groups, are not problems, indicators of developmental deﬁcit, or the function of
variables that have to be “controlled.” Rather, they are to be expected, and they must be
treated as differences, not deviations, by researchers and practitioners alike.
A sociocultural/dialogical perspective on the study of moral development also gives
rise to a number of other important questions. One set of empirical questions concerns the
degree of correspondence between person’s inner moral dialogues and the external inter-
actionsandconversationsfromwhichtheyarise,ontheonehand,andthemoralnarratives
to which they give rise, on the other. Another set of more educational or applied questions
concerns whether or not Vygotsky’s (1978) conception of the “Zone of Proximal Devel-
opment” (ZPD) might provide a helpful model for moral education efforts. On this view,
certain activities of adults and more competent peers might encourage children and youth
to move through the ZPD, from their actual level of moral functioning to their potential
level (see Tappan, 1998a, 1998b; also Moll, 1990; Rogoff & Wertsch, 1984; Tharp & Gal-
limore, 1988). This last set of questions, needless to say, clearly calls for more work, both
theoretical and empirical, regarding how to assess developmental levels of moral func-
tioning in a way that avoids the universal standards that have traditionally been employed
to chart developmental progress, and yet provides some means by which distinctions can
be drawn between different types/forms/manifestations of moral functioning (while still
honoring differences between social groups, as described).
Thisraises,ofcourse,thequestionofmoralrelativism—alwaysahotbuttonissueinany
discussion of moral development. Although this issue cannot be explored in detail here, aP1: IML
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sociocultural/dialogicalperspectiveseekstoremainopentoalltypes/forms/manifestations
of moral functioning, and thus does not assume, unlike Kohlberg (1981, 1984), that nor-
mative moral judgments must be embedded in a theory of moral development. Judgments
aboutdevelopmentaladequacy,ontheotherhand,usingdifferentiationandhierarchicalin-
tegration, for example, as evidence of ontogenetic progress (see Werner & Kaplan, 1956),
are certainly an appropriate, and necessary part of theoretical, empirical, and applied
efforts.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, by linking Vygotskian insights about semiotic
mediation and the social origins of mind to a Bakhtinian conception of the dialogic moral
self (see Day & Tappan, 1996), a sociocultural/dialogical approach offers a distributed or
shared vision of moral development (in contrast to the individualistic/psychological view
that has dominated the ﬁeld for the past century or so). This vision, among other things,
sets the stage for a new and powerful understanding of moral community: Communities
that promote moral development are not composed of discrete, self-contained, isolated
individuals. Rather, successful moral communities consist of dialogical selves engaged in
an ongoing process of interpretation, and committed, necessarily, to dialogue, discussion,
and mutual exchange across differences (see Burbules, 1993; Oakeshott, 1975; Sandel,
1982; Walzer, 1987). In addition, such a perspective on moral community provides the
keyt oanswering critical questions about both “morality” and “development” that must be
addressed as the ﬁeld of moral development enters the 21st century. On this view morality
mustbeunderstoodasadiscursivelymediatedpracticeoranactivitythatfacilitateshuman
interaction in community. And development must be understood not as an individual
achievement, but as a process that, at its core, entails relational, communal, political, and
even cultural transformation.
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